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Abstract  
 
 This thesis aims to compare and contrast stakeholder positions to proposed news aggregator 
regulations in the European Union (EU) and Australia (AU). The EU and AU have both sought to 
apply regulatory pressure to force Google News to remunerate press publishers for aggregating their 
news content. The research setting of the EU and AU was selected because the two governments 
have differing conceptions of copyright stemming from their respective civil law and common law 
legal traditions. Thus, this thesis hypothesizes that the EU approach of protecting the creator itself 
versus the AU approach of defending the entire public domain of news content will be reflected in 
consultation submissions. In other words, this thesis will identify the frames or “specific aspect[s] of 
a policy proposal that [are] emphasized in a policy debate by a specific actor” in the EU versus AU 
consultation submissions (Entman, 1991). While there is existing literature that empirically 
demonstrates the benefits and threats of news aggregators as well as a body of literature advocating 
for a re-framing of the news aggregator debate, no studies have systematically extracted the frames 
put forth by stakeholders. Thus, by performing a quantitative text analysis of EU and AU 
stakeholder consultation submissions (n = 243), this thesis will offer a systematic mapping of 
current frames and draw connections to both jurisdictions’ legal conceptions of copyright. The 
results generated by this analysis will aim to inform future stakeholder framing already being 
considered in other news markets around the globe, including the United States. 
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Introduction  
 
In the early aughts, Larry Page and Sergey Brin found themselves in Rupert Murdoch’s inner 
circle. It was an unlikely pairing — the co-founders of Google and the Executive Chairman of News 
Corp — as the two businesses not only represented competing ways to access information, but also 
markedly different management styles. Yet, Murdoch was curious. While hosting Page and Brin at 
his ranch in California, Murdoch bombarded the two brains behind the search engine with 
questions. Murdoch’s third wife, Wendi Deng Murdoch, paraphrased one question in particular that 
fittingly captured a problem Murdoch would grapple with for the rest of his career, “why you no 
read newspapers? (Wolff & Wolff, 2008). The public record doesn’t confirm how Page and Brin 
responded, but it didn’t take long for Murdoch to identify his own answer to that question — 
Google News. By 2009, Murdoch would pivot to launch an aggressive crusade against Google that 
would span across the globe, most notably in the three major markets of News Corp’s newspaper 
portfolio — the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.  
Murdoch’s argument centered on the perceived threat of news aggregators to the business 
model of news organizations. As he explained to a group of U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
regulators, “our friends online…think they have a right to take our news content and use it for their 
own purposes without contributing a penny to its production…to be impolite, it’s theft” (Murdoch, 
2009). Yet, Google offers a different argument, emphasizing the consumer benefit of news 
aggregation and “virtual newsagent” role that drives traffic to online news sites (Tryhorn, 2009). 
Eleven years later, the stakeholders involved the news aggregator policy debate have expanded well 
beyond Murdoch probing Page and Brin on his California ranch. Yet, these two competing 
arguments have guided research across disciplines to understand the legality, business implications, 
and economic incentives attached with requiring Google News to pay press publishers for their 
news content. At the crux of this research, is the question succinctly distilled by one research team 
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— new rights or new business models? (Senftleben et al., 2017). In other words, should the 
government intervene to provide press publishers with the right to receive remuneration from 
aggregators who use their content, or should it be the responsibility of press publishers to innovate 
with business models that will thrive in the digital world? 
Subsequently, this thesis is concerned with understanding how the competing perspectives 
put forth by news aggregators, press publishers, and other peripheral stakeholders interact within the 
context of the news aggregator policy debate in the European Union (EU) and Australia (AU). This 
will be accomplished via a text analysis of the consultations administered by the two governments 
during the policy formation stages of the debate. Embedded within this analysis is the distinction 
between the civil law and common law understanding of copyright that ground my hypothesis of 
how stakeholder responses between the two countries will differ. This analysis is informed by 
framing theory which captures the idea that there is meaning in what a stakeholder chooses to 
emphasize and ignore in their consultation submission. Framing theory will be utilized to organize 
and group the outputs of the text analysis. Thus, this thesis is divided into three parts. First, the text 
of the submissions will be converted into a vector space to calculate the similarity of consultation 
submissions. Second, topic modeling will be performed to extract frames present in the EU and AU 
consultations. A frame is defined by Entman (1991) as a “specific aspect of a policy proposal that is 
emphasized in a policy debate by a specific actor.” Third, the results of the topic modeling will be 
verified via manual text analysis to understand whether the identified frames are unique or 
duplicated across the civil law legal system of the EU and common law legal system of AU. These 
results will be coupled with a qualitative analysis of the policy aftermath to gauge the success of 
different frames and better understand which frames may prove to be most useful as other countries 
pursue news aggregator regulation in the future.  
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Statement and Justification of Problem  
There has been substantial global interest in regulating news aggregators. The digital 
disruption to the newspaper industry has motivated governments to pursue an aggressive regulatory 
agenda to address the perceived market power imbalance between press publishers and news 
aggregators. While proposed and enacted policies all share the core goal of making news aggregators 
pay for the use of news content, the scope of these efforts vary significantly across governments. 
Subsequently, this thesis aims to explore how news industry stakeholders inform different policy 
approaches within the research setting of the EU and AU. Since the EU has a civil law legal system 
and the AU has a common law legal system, the two countries have different conceptions of 
copyright and thus offer an ideal framework for contrasting differing regulatory approaches. The 
scope of this thesis will be further narrowed to one news aggregator — Google News. This decision 
to focus the stakeholder narrative on Google News is prompted by Google News being the most 
visited news aggregator in the world (Newman, 2020). Moreover, Google News has been the explicit 
target of both EU and AU regulators as elaborated upon later.  
The objective of this thesis is to compare and contrast stakeholder responses to proposed 
EU and AU news aggregator regulations — Article 15 of the “EU Directive on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market” and “ACCC Draft Mandatory Bargaining Code for News Media and Digital 
Platforms” respectively. While both policies aim to require news aggregators to compensate press 
publishers for aggregating their news content, the EU policy confers a “press publishers’ right” 
whereas the AU policy pursues a competition law-based approach via bargaining rights. This thesis 
proposes that the civil law conception of copyright in the EU and the common law conception in 
the AU will translate to how the news industry stakeholder narrative is framed in the EU and AU. In 
broad terms, civil law jurisdictions aim to protect “creators and their claims to ensure the 
authenticity of their works” whereas common law jurisdictions focus on “the audience and its hopes 
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for an expansive public domain” (Baldwin, 2014). Thus, I hypothesize that the EU stakeholder 
narrative will emphasize creators (writers, journalists, authors) whereas the AU stakeholder narrative 
will emphasize access to the news content itself. To evaluate this hypothesis, I will perform a 
quantitative text analysis of consultations conducted by the EU and AU during the policy formation 
stages of their news aggregator regulations. These consultations collect responses from relevant 
stakeholders including press publishers, journalists, advocacy groups, collective management 
organizations, and Google. The methodology will be guided by three research questions:  
1)  How textually similar are the EU and AU consultation responses?  
2)  What frames do EU and AU consultation respondents employ in their submissions?   
3)  How do the frames identified in Question 2 appear in the consultations and inform the   
fsf contrasting regulatory approaches of the EU and AU? 
The first question will assess the textual similarity between each consultation submission. 
This metric captures how similar the vocabulary usage is across a set of documents by creating a 
vector space model, a method for representing the contents of a document numerically by counting 
the repetition of each word. The output of this method will be coordinates assigned to each 
consultation submission to plot each submission on a cluster map. In other words, this first question 
aims to uncover whether the EU and AU consultation responses share a similar vocabulary by 
evaluating the distance between each submission on a cluster map. Question 2 will further explore 
the cluster map by extracting the most repeated keywords from each cluster via topic modeling. 
These keywords will offer a starting point to uncover the frames employed by consultation 
respondents. Yet, recognizing a keyword does not necessarily equate to a frame, this method will be 
supplemented by manual text analysis of the submissions to verify and contextualize the results 
found in Question 2. And to answer the third question, the frames identified in Question 2 will be 
compared between the EU and AU. This analysis will be supplemented by qualitative research 
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regarding the policy debate aftermath to evaluate the success of each frame in civil law versus 
common law contexts.  
The motivation for this thesis rests upon the fact that while the EU and AU were the first 
governments to pursue sweeping policy reform to address news aggregators, they will certainly not 
be the last. This is evidenced by similar regulatory efforts already being considered from India to 
Canada. While there has been significant research dedicated to the economic implications and 
legality of news aggregators, a gap in the literature exists that evaluates how the EU and AU news 
industry stakeholders frame their arguments. The answers to these three research questions can 
inform what argument framing resonates in common law versus civil law jurisdictions within the 
context of the news aggregator debate. Moving forward, these insights will be valuable to 
stakeholders in other markets who are currently evaluating the best framing approach for engaging 
in the news aggregator debate in their own country.  
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Background 
In order to establish the boundaries of this thesis, it is important to provide information 
regarding the definition of a news aggregator, the operating ethos of Google News, a brief history of 
prior attempts to regulate Google News, and descriptions of the EU and AU policymaking 
processes. Because regulation targeting Google News has existed from the onset of the aggregator 
itself, it is important to understand the context that fueled this increasingly divisive policy debate. 
What is a News Aggregator?  
This thesis will use Kimberley Isbell’s (2010) definition of a news aggregator — “a website 
that takes information from multiple sources and displays it in a single place.” While the term news 
aggregator is often used interchangeably with news reader, feed reader, or RSS reader, the 
vocabulary of this thesis will be limited to news aggregator. Isbell groups news aggregators into four 
categories: feed aggregators, specialty aggregators, user-curated aggregators, and blog aggregators. As 
mentioned earlier, the scope of this thesis will be narrowed to Google News, which Isbell 
categorizes as a feed aggregator. Generally, the traditional conception of a news aggregator is a feed 
aggregator which indexes material from multiple websites and organizes content by source, topic, or 
story (Isbell, 2010). Outside the scope of this thesis are the remaining three categories of news 
aggregators identified by Isbell. Since Isbell’s categorization of news aggregators, social media sites 
have launched features that perform similar functions to traditional feed aggregators such as 
Facebook News. Moreover, it could even be argued that social media platforms could be holistically 
categorized as user-generated aggregators. However, because this thesis focuses solely on Google 
News, these distinctions will not be explored further. 
History of Google News  
The following section details the aggregator’s origins, algorithmic architecture, business 
model, and relationship with press publishers to color the landscape of consultation submissions.  
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The impetus for Google News occurred in the hours after 9/11. Head of Google Search, 
Amit Singhal, realized a search for “New York Twin Towers” yielded no relevant results because 
Google was indexing content from a month earlier. So, for the first time ever, Google placed links 
to CNN and The Washington Post reporting on its homepage with the message, “please visit these sites 
to get the news of the day, because our search is failing you” (The Evolution of Search, 2011). The beta 
version of Google News launched a year later on September 22, 2006. (Bharart, 2006). Today, 
Google News operates 70 country-specific editions and indexes articles across 80,000 news 
publications. While press publishers and even other aggregators such as Apple News rely on human 
editors to select and package articles, Google News is entirely automated (Sullivan, 2009). The 
aggregator runs on an algorithm separate from the search engine that has been overhauled 
repeatedly since 2002. Most notably in 2018, Google News began leveraging artificial intelligence 
and machine learning to deliver personalized news content to users — reinforcing the initial vision 
of Google’s co-founders to make editorial decisions without human editors (Upstill, 2018). Yet, 
despite these changes, the basic interface remains strikingly similar to the initial beta version 
displaying the headline, first few sentences of an article, and link to the original publication.  
While the interface of Google News appears seemingly straightforward, there is a veil of 
mystery surrounding its algorithm and business model. A particular point of contention among 
publishers is the lack of specificity offered by Google regarding how the algorithm prioritizes which 
content it displays. Additionally, because the aggregator does not run any advertisements, the value 
Google derives from funneling readers to the search engine where searches do yield advertising 
revenue is unclear. The only time Google News has been publicly valued was in 2008 at Fortune’s 
Brainstorm Tech Conference where Google Vice President, Marissa Mayer, offhandedly quoted a 
$100 million estimation (Fortt, 2008). This number has been the source of intense scrutiny as press 
publishers sought to blame Google News for declining subscription rates and the shuttering of local 
Ors  12 
newsrooms. While Google has responded by launching its Digital News Initiative in Europe, 
scrapping its controversial First Click Free policy that circumvented news paywalls, and offering 
publishers more user data to target subscribers — these concessions have seemingly not quelled 
press publisher’s complaints.  
Early Google News Litigation and Regulation: 2005 – 2014  
The early lawsuits involving Google News stemmed from press publishers suing Google for 
making their news articles available on the aggregator without their permission. The plaintiffs argued 
Google must obtain permission from press publishers (the copyright owners) prior to aggregating 
their news articles. Google responded by pointing out (1) any press publisher can “opt-out” from 
their content being aggregated, (2) the snippets of content displayed qualify as fair use, and (3) there 
is a public good benefit to expanding access to news content. The following section will survey the 
outcomes of early litigation against Google News.  
In 2005, Agence-France-Presse (AFP), a newsgathering agency based in Paris, filed the first 
copyright infringement lawsuit against Google News (Cozens, 2005). Before the AFP case was 
resolved, Copipresse, a collective management organization (CMO) representing French and 
German-language newspapers in Belgium, filed a similar lawsuit against Google News (Crampton, 
2007). The outcomes of both cases were not outright victories for press publishers. AFP settled with 
Google on undisclosed terms and Copipresse content was removed from the search engine index 
entirely after the court ordered Google to pay royalty payment to Copipresse (Auchard, 2007; 
Sterling, 2011). These early lawsuits proved a larger, more consolidated response would be needed if 
press publishers wanted to hold Google News accountable.  
The shift from individual lawsuits to regulatory attempts can be attributed to Spain and 
Germany, who were the first to enact a press publisher right which “gives press publishers the 
exclusive right to authorize the reproduction and making available to the public of their press 
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publications for online uses” (Mullooly, 2020). In 2013, the German Parliament passed Section 87f-h 
of the “German Copyright Act 9” which introduced a press publisher right. The Spanish 
Competition Authority (CNMC) soon after amended the “Ley de Propiedad Intelectual,” 
introducing a similar press publisher right over news content. Yet, there was one important 
distinction — in Germany, the right was waivable, allowing press publishers to continue to be 
indexed by news aggregators, whereas the right was not waivable in Spain. Google News responded 
accordingly, switching to an opt-in policy in Germany and shutting down operations in Spain 
entirely (Román, 2014).  
EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market  
Following the German and Spanish regulatory efforts, the EU commission adopted the 
Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy in 2015 to address how digital technologies are changing how 
copyrighted content is produced, accessed, and distributed (European Commission, 2015). While the 
DSM signaled the EU embrace of a complete overhaul of the copyright laws governing the 28-
member bloc, there was a particular focus on news aggregators, particularly Google News. This 
focus on Google was no secret. As Andrej Savin, an internet government professor at the 
Copenhagen Business School explained, “it’s a fact of life that most innovative companies come 
from the West Coast...the proposals coming from Brussels definitely have the American companies 
in mind” (Scott, 2016). Accordingly, the “Directive on Copyright in the Single Market” (CDSMD) 
was passed by the Council of the European Union on April 15, 2019 with a 19-6 vote (European 
Council, 2019). Of interest to this thesis is Article 15 (formerly Article 11) which grants a press 
publisher right in order “to strengthen [press publisher’s] bargaining position and improve their 
remuneration when they negotiate the use of their content by online platforms” (European 
Commission, 2018). The ambiguity of Article 15 was left to individual member states to resolve the 
Ors  14 
implementation issues of CDSMD. At this point, it is still unclear how the practical application of 
Article 15 will impact Google News.  
ACCC Draft Mandatory Bargaining Code for News Media and Digital Platforms  
Following the passage of the CDSMD in the EU, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) began negotiating the “Draft Mandatory Bargaining Code for News Media 
and Digital Platforms” (DMBC). Currently, the proposed version of the DMBC, released on July 31, 
2020, would only apply to Facebook and Google because both platforms are perceived to hold a 
significant bargaining power imbalance with Australian news media businesses (ACCC, 2020). 
Unlike the press publisher right provided in the EU Directive, the DMBC takes a competition law 
approach by requiring Google to share revenue from news links with eligible media companies 
determined by the Australian Communication and Media Authority (ACMA). If Google cannot 
reach an agreement with press publishers on payment within three months of negotiation, it can 
move to arbitration overseen by the ACMA. The DMBC also empowers the ACCC to issue 
copyright infringement notices and fines for breach of the code. The DMBC was passed by the 
Australian Parliament on February 25, 2021, an effort led by federal treasurer Josh Frydenberg.  
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Literature Review 
Given news aggregators emerged barely two decades ago, academic research covering the 
topic is fairly nascent. However, literature does exist discussing the economic effects of news 
aggregators, including competitive dynamics and substitutability. There is also a body of literature 
concerned with evaluating the narrative of stakeholders within the media landscape and identifying 
opportunities to re-frame policy. Subsequently, this literature review will sample research related to 
these topics to help locate the contributions of this thesis. 
Do News Aggregators Compete with Press Publishers?  
The question of whether news aggregators help or hurt press publishers is not settled. A 
handful of studies have administered surveys to address the question of whether a competitive 
relationship exists between press publishers and news aggregators. Before discussing these studies, it 
is important to be aware that there are two spheres of competition within media: inter-media and 
intra-media competition. Inter-media competition refers to competition between different forms of 
media such as online publications competing with traditional print media. Intra-media competition 
captures competition within an industry such as online news and is often characterized as the more 
intense form of competition because of high product substitutability (Picard, 1998; Chyi and Sylvie, 
1998). The advent of news aggregators introduced new dynamics to both inter and intra-media 
competition, however most research concentrates on the intra-media competition between news 
aggregators and online news outlets.  
Yang and Chyi (2011) analyzed reader survey data collected from 27 U.S. daily newspapers 
and found evidence of a non-competitive relationship between online newspaper sites and other 
news sites such as local and regional news, information sites, national news sites, and portal news 
sites. This initial study was built upon by Huang (2013) which extended Yang and Chyi’s 
examination of intra-media competition to news aggregators in the online news market in Taiwan. 
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The study found online news sites do not exhibit a competitive relationship with one another. 
However, a statistically significant competitive relationship did exist between Yahoo! News (a news 
aggregator) and Apple Daily (a tabloid newspaper whose content was not available on the 
aggregator). The mixed results of these studies prompted Lee and Chyi (2015) to further investigate 
the relationship between news aggregators and other news media, controlling for key demographic 
and psychological factors. Their survey results found Google News, Yahoo News, and Huffington 
Post all had a negative correlation with other media outlets. This is the most convincing evidence so 
far that a non-competitive relationship exists between news aggregators and traditional news 
websites.   
Is Google News a Substitute or Complement to News Outlets? 
As governments began regulating Google News, a body of literature emerged using these 
markets as natural experiments to examine whether news aggregators are substitutes or 
complements to press publishers. News aggregators would be considered substitutes for traditional 
news consumption if they reduce the incentive for consumers to click article links and read the 
entire article on the press publisher’s own website. In other words, if consumers are satisfied with 
the snippets of news content provided by a news aggregator, they would substitute that aggregator 
instead of visiting each press publisher’s individual website. News aggregators would be considered 
complements if they drive traffic to press publisher’s online news sites. The “press publisher right” 
passed in Germany and Spain described earlier offers the ideal research setting for a natural 
experiment because the regulations prompted Google News to shut down in Spain. Thus, scholars 
have been able to evaluate news consumption before and after the shutdown in Spain. Calzada and 
Gill (2020) studied these scenarios and found the Google News shutdown reduced traffic to Spanish 
news outlets between 8% and 14%. The study revealed that the degree to which the shutdown 
affected an outlet’s traffic depended on its value proposition — outlets that focused on sports, 
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regional news, or were lower-ranked tended to be the most harmed by the shutdown. Another 
closely related paper published by Athey et al. (2017) found the shutdown reduced overall news 
consumption of users in Spain by approximately 20% and reduced news outlet page views by 10%. 
Similar to Calzada and Gill, Athey et al. found the decline was most significant for smaller 
publishers. Both these papers reference Chiou and Tucker (2016), which was one of the first papers 
to pursue a natural experiment related to news aggregators by analyzing news consumption 
following the Associated Press’s (AP) content dispute with Google News that resulted in the 
removal of AP content for the aggregator. Chiou and Tucker found traffic to other news outlets 
from Google News declined by 28% following the AP removal and contributed to a decline of 110 
million visits each month to news outlets. All of these studies point to the increasing evidence that 
Google News is a complement to traditional press publisher’s websites given their website traffic 
suffered when Google News shutdown in certain instances. 
Does Google News Benefit or Harm Press Publishers?  
In order to make sense of the conclusions drawn above that news aggregators do not 
compete and are not substitutes with news outlets; the question remains — why then have press 
publishers been so aggressive in their lobbying efforts to regulate Google News? The answer to this 
question becomes clearer after unpacking research that describes how news aggregators have 
changed the landscape of news consumption habits. From a press publishers’ perspective, Jeon and 
Nasr (2016) found that news aggregators increase the quality of news content, thereby increasing 
consumer surplus and welfare. Yet a separate study conducted by Jeon (2018) also found evidence 
that while news aggregators increase traffic to individual news articles, they reduce traffic to 
newspaper homepages. And even more concerning, Dellarocos et al. (2016) found that the more 
information provided by the news aggregator in terms of snippet length, the less likely users are to 
click to the original article. This sampling of research indicates that while there is mounting empirical 
Ors  18 
evidence that news aggregators drive consumption, there is competing evidence that this type of 
news consumption may not be advantageous to press publishers and more importantly, may not 
offer a clear pathway for monetization. 
Is There a Better Way Forward for Media Businesses?  
The last portion of this literature review will concentrate on studies that have examined the 
policy narratives put forth by media business stakeholders. This also ties to the motivation for this 
thesis because these papers often advocate for a re-framing of the current discussion guiding policy 
ideas such as “a press publisher right.” For example, Searle (2020) evaluated responses to UK 
government consultations on copyright to uncover an overall defensive tone among media 
stakeholders that their business models need protecting. Yet, Searle contextualizes these results to 
also suggest that the business model narrative may be unproductive and a shift to an innovation 
focus may be needed. A different narrative is put forth by Frosio (2020) who reviews the failures of 
the CDSMD to suggest the EU should shift away from author’s rights and instead advocate for a 
“welfare and cultural theory.” And while perhaps a bit more distant from the media narrative, Khan 
(2017) illuminated that the consumer welfare argument put forth by online platforms are not 
equipped to capture the market power imbalance and a different approach is needed when justifying 
the application of competition law.  
As noted in this sampling of papers, there is hardly a consensus of how the future policy 
debate regarding the regulation of online platforms and their relationship with media enterprises 
should be framed. Subsequently, this thesis will contribute to the groundwork by providing a 
systematic overview of current frames being pursued by stakeholders affected by news aggregator 
policies — information that is necessary to better understand the context for proposed frames 
detailed above.  
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Theoretical Framework  
This thesis is grounded in the interaction of two theoretical ideas: framing theory and 
differing legal conceptions of copyright. The relationship between the two theories is captured in the 
hypothesis which leverages framing theory to suggest that EU and AU stakeholders will tailor their 
arguments according to the civil and common law conceptions of copyright. In other words, 
framing theory offers the structure which will express how EU and AU stakeholders position their 
arguments in two different legal systems.  
Framing Theory 
The methodology of this thesis will be informed by framing theory. The most widely cited 
definition of framing is, “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in 
a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” 
(Entman, 1993). This definition is widely accepted by interest group scholars across political science, 
psychology, sociology, and communications to evaluate the arguments interest groups promote and 
how this affects their policy influence.  
The framing of specific policy issues that have been analyzed using this theory include the 
death penalty, the Gulf War, the Kosovo crisis, pornography, and the Monica Lewinsky scandal 
(Kluver and Mahoney, 2015). All of these studies performed systematic text analysis to extract 
frames from a set of documents related to the policy issue of interest. As referenced earlier, a frame 
is “a specific aspect of a policy proposal that is emphasized in a policy debate by a specific actor” 
(Entman, 1991) Thus, by reviewing public documents such as parliamentary debates, committee 
deliberations, presidential speeches, news articles, or consultations, a researcher is able to simplify a 
complex issue and extract “words and images that make up a frame” that are used to “promote 
perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side while hindering the other” (Entman, 2010). 
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Thus, issues best suited for the application of framing theory include those that are “highly salient, 
controversial, and partisan” where different groups of stakeholders are emphasizing different aspects 
of a policy’s implications (Kluver and Mahoney, 2015).   
To build upon the Literature Review, research that has utilized framing theory to evaluate texts 
related to public policy issues was further examined. For example, Schonhardt-Bailey (2005) 
performed quantitative text analysis on 20 speeches related to national security given by John Kerry 
and President George W. Bush during the 2004 Presidential Election. The results identified multiple 
frames, including a “gratitude” and “fear” frame employed by Kerry and Bush respectively. 
According to Schonhardt-Bailey, Kerry “invoked the image of shared military experience and 
sacrifice” whereas Bush “painted the world as a fearful and evil place” (Schonhardt-Bailey, 2005).  
Inspired by Schonhardt-Bailey, Kluver and Mahoney (2015) sought to extract frames from 
two EU public policy debates — (1) regulating CO2 car emissions and (2) international rail passenger 
rights. The textual data used in this study was consultation responses separately collected by the 
European Commission on both policy proposals. Through quantitative text analysis, Kluver and 
Mahoney identified the presence of a “press,” “industry,” and “environment” frame in the CO2 
debate and an “accessibility,” “voluntary,” and “passengers” frame in the rail passenger debate 
which she contextualized in the policy aftermath to discuss which stakeholders prevailed, concluding 
it was the automobile industry and rail operators. In this thesis, a similar methodology will be 
applied to the news aggregator consultation responses in order to compare the extracted frames to 
the hypothesized frames informed by the EU and AU conceptions of copyright, discussed next.  
Conceptions of Copyright: Civil Law versus Common Law  
 
The first copyright act in the world was the “Copyright Act of Queen Anne,” passed in 
1710. It is often considered “the source of Anglo-American copyright law” (Bracha, 2010). The idea 
for the statue originated with the Stationers’ Company of London, a printing guild who had been 
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petitioning the Crown for nearly a decade for increased protection for printed books. However, after 
multiple bills proposed by the Stationers’ Company failed, the guild changed strategy in 1707 by 
“eliminating all references to censorship and shifting the gravity center of the argument to the 
protection of authors and the encouragement of learning” (Bracha, 2010). By positioning authors as 
the “prime beneficiaries” of the statue, it was enacted three years later. Interestingly, the history of 
the “Copyright Act of Queen Anne” not only offers an example of the value of re-framing a policy 
debate, but it also serves as a starting point for understanding how the conception of copyright has 
evolved across time and place in the following centuries.  
There is no single common-law or civil law intellectual property (IP) legal system. As the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) points out, “even within the two general legal 
traditions, common and civil, laws differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; and every individual 
system of law has its own history and development” (Harms & World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 2018). A unilateral conception of copyright within the civil law or common law 
tradition does not exist. Yet, there is still a rich theoretical discourse surrounding the differences of 
the two legal traditions that will be drawn upon in this thesis. It is also important to note that the 
differences of how copyright is conceived will be grounded in theory, rather than procedural 
differences. WIPO defines the IP differences in common law versus civil law countries as “relatively 
small” with only two major procedural differences: the role of the judge and use of precedents (ibid). 
Subsequently, the theoretical approach of this thesis is captured by the phrase “conception of 
copyright” to denote the focus on comparing the nature of copyright within the two legal traditions.  
The differences in how civil versus common law conceive of copyright begins with the name 
of the right itself. The civil law tradition uses “author’s right” whereas the common law tradition 
uses “copyright” (Harms & World Intellectual Property Organization, 2018). This distinction serves 
as a starting point to understand how the two traditions view their role in protecting creative works. 
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As mentioned earlier, civil law targets, “creators and their claims to ensure the authenticity of their 
works” (Baldwin, 2014). This idea is said to romanticize the role of the individual artist and “protect 
the creator’s vision from commercialization and exploitation” (ibid). Consequently, the idea of 
author’s rights is often criticized with restraining, “distribution, inhibiting experimentation, and 
public exposure” (ibid). On the other hand, the common law perspective uses the term copyright to, 
“focus on the audience and its hopes for an expansive public domain” (ibid). By regarding the 
creator as an entrepreneur and the work as a product, copyright aims to encourage innovation and 
promote dissemination. It is this idea that gives creators, “a limited economic monopoly over their 
work to stimulate their creativity, eventually enrich the public domain, and thereby serve the public 
interest” (ibid). Criticisms of copyright often associate the idea as “philistine and commercial, 
treating noble creation as a mere commodity” (ibid). This idea of the civil law conception favoring 
the creator and the common law conception favoring the consumer’s access to content serves as the 
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Methodology  
This thesis will be guided by the three research questions defined in the Statement and 
Justification of Problem. The first question examines the textual similarity of EU and AU consultation 
responses by generating a vector space model to visually represent each submission on a cluster 
map. The second question will build upon this cluster map and perform topic modeling to extract 
relevant keywords from submissions and begin to identify the frames employed in the EU and AU 
submissions. Lastly, the third question will perform manual text analysis to verify the frames 
identified in the second question. These frames will also be contextualized in the aftermath of the 
final policy proposals to draw conclusions about which frames prevail in a common law versus civil 
law legal system. Before expanding upon this methodology, the consultation datasets that serve as 
the building blocks of this thesis will be described.  
Data Collection  
This thesis will use two public consultations, one conducted by the European Commission 
and the other by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The practice of 
administering consultations occurs early in the policymaking process to gather public opinions from 
stakeholders on a particular issue. In the case of the news aggregator debate, both the EU and AU 
used consultations to scope stakeholder opinions on news aggregators to determine whether 
proposed regulations are an appropriate path forward. The raw submission files were downloaded 
from the EU and AU consultation websites for analysis. Submissions explicitly referenced in this 
thesis were compiled into two PDFs titled “EU Selected Submissions” and “AU Selected 
Submissions.” Both files were publicly uploaded to Dropbox and the links to these files are included 
in References.  
The EU consultation, “Public Consultation on the Role of Publishers in the Copyright Value 
Chain and Panorama Exception,” was administered from March 23, 2016 to June 15, 2016. As the 
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title infers, the consultation combined two separate public policy issues related to copyright — press 
publications and architecture or sculpture in public places (the “panorama exception”). The 
complete dataset includes 6,203 responses, counting both the press publication and the “panorama 
exception” sections. However, only the press publication section is relevant to this thesis which 
received 3,957 replies. These responses were split into five categories by the European Commission: 
registered organizations, non-registered organizations, individuals, anonymous, and the 
#fixcopyright coalition. Given the AU consultation did not include replies from individuals in their 
personal capacities, this analysis of the EU consultation was limited to submissions from registered 
and non-registered organizations. The distinction of “registered” versus “non-registered” relates to 
an organizations status in the European Commission’s transparency register, a database that tracks 
lobbying efforts of “registered” organizations. It should be noted that although the individual, 
anonymous, and #fixcopyright coalition categories represented over 80% of the total responses to 
the consultation, the majority of these submissions shared a standardized form response.  
Amongst the registered and non-registered organization submissions, relevant stakeholder 
groups were identified to align with the AU consultation, resulting in some submissions to be 
eliminated from the dataset that represented non-relevant interests such as performing arts 
organizations. Moreover, while the consultation accepted responses written in English, French, and 
German, this thesis evaluated only responses submitted in English. After cleaning the dataset 
accordingly, the final EU consultation dataset included 132 submissions. Further information about 
stakeholder representation and geographic distribution of these submissions is found in the Sample 
Statistics section.  
The AU consultation, “Digital Platforms Inquiry,” was administered in two phases. The first 
phase, lasting from February 26, 2018 to April 3, 2018 sought responses to an “Issues Paper” with 
the goal of understanding, “the impact of digital platforms on the supply of news and journalistic 
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content” (ACCC, 2018). Responses from the second phase, open from December 10, 2018 to 
February 15, 2019, were prompted by a “Preliminary Report” which outlined 11 recommendations 
and eight areas for further analysis by the ACCC. The first phase received 77 responses and the 
second phase received 124 responses, for a total of 201 responses. All responses are in English. For 
the purposes of this thesis, the responses from both phases will be considered in aggregate. If a 
stakeholder responded to both phases, the two responses were aggregated into one observation for 
analysis. After combining necessary submissions and removing submissions that represented non-
relevant stakeholder groups, the final AU consultation dataset included 111 submissions.  
Data Preparation  
Merging the EU and AU datasets yielded a complete dataset of 243 submissions — 
considered the “corpus” of this thesis. Before performing quantitative text analysis, the corpus was 
pre-processed. Both the pre-processing and later text analysis were completed using the Natural 
Language Toolkit (NLTK) module within Python. In order to manipulate the corpus with NLTK, 
each submission was converted from a PDF to a TXT file. As the EU consultation included a 
multiple-choice section, the conversion of the EU submissions required additional formatting to 
include only the short answer responses in the TXT file. Once all 243 submissions were converted 
to TXT files and saved in a directory, a DataFrame was built in Python to organize the corpus. The 
5 x 243 DataFrame dedicated a row to each submission and columns to organize important 
identifier information associated with each submission including organization name, headquarter 
location (denoted by “ctry”), and stakeholder type (Table 1).  
Table 1. DataFrame Sample 
 
Index Organization Name  Cons.   Ctry Stakeholder Type Submission Text  
0 
 
University of Vienna: 
Media Governance... 
 
EU AT Education or Research 
Institution  
“The controversial outcomes in Spain 
and in Germany of introducing...” 
1 Allied for Startups EU   BE Startup “Today “writers” are everywhere 
blogging and commenting on...” 
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After organizing the corpus, a series of NLTK modules were applied to the “Consultation 
Text” column to prepare the submissions for text analysis. This included converting all letters to 
lower case and removing stop words, punctuation, and special characters. Stop words are common 
words in language that do not convey relevance when identifying meaning such as “the.” The final 
step of the pre-processing stage was word stemming, a NLTK module that converts words to their 
base forms such as from “reporting” to “report.”   
Question 1: Measuring Textual Similarity  
After the dataset was prepared, the methodology to achieve the results needed for Question 
1 began. To calculate the textual similarity of the submissions, the “Document Clustering with 
Python” guide was referenced (Rose, 2020). First, the corpus was transformed into a vector space 
using term frequency-inverse document frequency (TFIDF). TFIDF represents text numerically by 
counting the frequencies of individual words in each submission. In comparison to other weighting 
schemes, TFIDF assigns smaller word weights to commonly used words (Bochkay et al., 2020). This 
attribute is especially helpful given all submissions are responding to one of two consultation 
prompts and often repeat vocabulary featured in these prompts. The underlying assumption of 
TFIDF is that words repeated less often contain more meaning in relation to the document. This 
prevents repetition of less-meaningful words from distorting the final output. After representing the 
corpus in the TFIDF matrix, the cosine similarity between each submission and the other 
submissions in the corpus were calculated. Cosine similarity ranges between zero and one, where 
 
2 AMEC / FIBEP EU  BE Trade Association (Media) “For services where contents need to 
be communicated to the clients...” 
 
3 Association of Belgian 
Publishers 
EU BE Book Publisher “When signing a contract with their 
authors publishers receive the...” 
 
... ... ... ... ... ... 
 
242 StartupAUS AU AU Technology Company “StartupAUS does not support 
Preliminary Recommendation 7...” 
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zero indicates complete dissimilarity and one indicates complete agreement. The advantage of cosine 
similarity is it naturally controls for the length of each submission, ensuring a longer submission can 
be compared to a shorter submission. The cosine similarity of each submission was then subtracted 
from one to achieve the cosine distance. 
Once cosine distance was calculated, it can be inputted into a k-means clustering algorithm 
to visually represent the similarity between each submission. K-means clustering is an iterative 
process to determine the optimal number of clusters. Each submission is assigned to a cluster and 
the mean of the cluster is calculated to find the centroid. Then, the submissions are reassigned to 
clusters and the centroids are recalculated until the algorithm reaches convergence. As a safeguard, 
an elbow plot was used to find the optimal number of clusters, which was confirmed to be eleven 
clusters (Appendix 1). The final step before mapping the output of the k-means clusters is to apply 
multidimensional scaling which translates the pairwise distances captured in the cosine distance 
metric into a two-dimensional array with x and y coordinates. The result is each submission can be 
plotted on an array, belonging to one of the eleven clusters.  
Question 2: Topic Modeling   
To understand how the submissions are framing their responses, with particular emphasis on 
uncovering if a distinction exists between the EU and AU framing as articulated in the Hypothesis, 
topic modeling was pursued. At its core, topic modeling is an unsupervised machine learning 
technique that scans a corpus, detecting word and phrase patterns to extract topics that best 
characterize the text. In contrast to supervised machine learning techniques, topic modeling does 
not require a predefined list of topics. The type of topic modeling utilized in this thesis built upon 
the methodology of the k-means clustering used for Question 1. By coding the clusters to yield the 
top six most frequent words of each cluster, a basic version of topic modeling was achieved. The 
benefit of this approach was it leveraged the TFIDF weighting scheme described earlier.  
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Question 3: Manual Text Analysis   
Once the output of the topic modeling was retrieved, manual text analysis of the individual 
submissions was performed to verify the results of the topics identified. In other words, the 
submissions were reviewed, and relevant topics were categorized and compared with the results of 
the topic modeling. This qualitative analysis is referenced in more detail in the Results section, but 
ultimately sought to contextualize the machine learning topics identified in the original context of 
the submissions themselves.  
Informed by the results of the topic modeling and manual text analysis, Question 3 also 
includes a qualitative review of the policy outcomes and current discussion related to news 
aggregator policy globally. This was completed via online research of the events following the 
consultations and regulatory activity in other countries. Acknowledging this research method is 




 The limitations of this methodology stem from the reality of comparing two consultations 
conducted by two different governments. First, the EU and AU consultations inherently had 
different prompts, formatting, and collection methods that could distort the ability to compare 
responses and reach generalizable conclusions. Second, while both consultations accepted responses 
from any member of the general public, it is unclear if distribution methods such as targeting 
specific types of organizations for responses were employed. This could bias the pool of stakeholder 
responses received and contribute to an unrepresentative sample. Third, non-English language 
responses and responses from certain stakeholder groups such as performing arts organizations were 
removed from the sample for data cleaning purposes that could impact the results. Lastly, the data 
cleaning methodology employed did not account for differences in Australian versus British versus 
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American English, which posed issues when performing topic modeling across submissions and 
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Results  
 
Summary Statistics  
As described in the Data Collection section, the dataset includes 243 submissions with 54% 
representation from the EU consultation and 46% representation from the AU consultation. For 
both consultations, submissions were received from organizations across the globe, demonstrating 
that the impact of these policy proposals was felt beyond EU and AU borders.  
Figure 1 illustrates the geographic distribution of the EU submissions. The country 
assignment for submissions with a global presence was determined by headquarter location. For 
example, Getty Images is considered to be located in the United States with headquarters in Seattle, 
despite operating in multiple EU member countries. The concentration of submissions from  
Figure 1. Count of EU Submissions by Country 
 
Belgium is driven by a number of principal EU government stakeholders located in Brussels. As 
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given the government operates as a 28-member bloc (before Brexit). And as referenced earlier, 
despite only English language submissions included in the dataset, 82% of EU member countries are 
represented. The six EU member countries not represented are Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia.  
In a similar manner, the geographic distribution of the AU submissions is represented in 
Figure 2. The majority of the submissions were received from organizations in AU, however 
approximately 20% of the submissions are from organizations headquartered in the United States. 
This is an important distinction, partially explicable by a large share of stakeholders representing 
technology and innovation interests headquartered in the United States. 
Figure 2. Count of AU Submissions by Country 
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identified, most including representation from both the EU and AU. However, there are several 
exceptions, most notably there is an EU emphasis on cultural history and information science with 
18 EU submissions in contrast to 0 AU submissions in the “Library/Cultural Heritage Institution” 
category. Another distinction in stakeholder representation is the AU consultation attracted 140% 
more academic scholars and legal practitioners in comparison to the EU consultation, captured by 
the combined stakeholder count totals of the “Education or Research Institution” and “Legal 
Institution” categories. 
 When considering stakeholder representation in the context of geographic distribution, 
additional insights emerge, including 75% of stakeholders in the “technology companies” category 
being located in the U.S. This is unsurprising given U.S. exports of technology products and services 
totaled $338 billion in 2019, indicating the global reach of U.S. technology companies and spurring 
the engagement of U.S. interests in the EU and AU consultations (CompTIA, 2020). This is 
certainly the case for Google, headquartered in Mountain View, California, with an obvious stake in 
the news aggregator debate, as established in the Background section. Google response to both 
consultations, submitting over 100 pages of expert testimony, economic analysis, and stakeholder 
opinion for consideration. Moreover, even U.S. technology companies without news aggregator 
products submitted responses to the consultations, reinforcing the mounting threat of the policy 
proposals and fear among technology companies that the aggressive regulatory agenda will expand 
to social media, software, and video streaming. The EU consultation received two U.S. technology 
company responses — Google and Mozilla — while the AU consultation received 9 responses 
including Oracle, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and Netflix. And it was not solely the companies 
themselves looking to protect U.S. interests in technology and innovation. The AU consultation 
attracted responses from public authorities such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and technology 
interest groups such as the BSA Software Alliance and Innovation Defense Foundation — all 
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headquartered in Washington, D.C. The fact that the AU consultation attracted more responses 
from technology interests in comparison the EU consultation points to the emphasis on the 
platforms themselves in the AU regulation. Whereas the EU consultation has a roster of 
stakeholders representing creative and artistic interests including more submissions in the 
“professional photographers,” “writers,” and “library/cultural heritage institutions” categories.  
Question 1: Textual Similarity  
 Figure 4 plots each consultation response on a two-dimensional plane to represent the 
textual similarity (use of similar vocabulary) of each submission. Each datapoint represents an 
individual submission, labeled with a number that corresponds to the organization name, indexed in  
Appendix 2. The dissimilarity of the EU and AU submissions is strikingly demonstrated with the 
EU submissions, coded in blue, clustering on the left-side of the plot and AU submissions, coded in 
grey, clustering on the right-side of the plot. 
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Figure 5 is the same plot, but coded by cluster assignment, grouping the 243 submissions 
into 11 clusters. There is limited crossover of the EU and AU submissions within each cluster. EU 
submissions comprise Cluster 1, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 11 and AU submissions comprise Cluster 2, 4, 8, 
and 9. Cluster 7 is the one cluster that exhibited a mixture of EU and AU submissions with K-
Monitor (#60), a digital rights NGO based in Hungary, joining a slew of consumer-focused 
stakeholders based in Australia. The overall separate grouping of the EU and AU submissions 
prompts further questions related to what differences exist in the vocabulary and content of the EU 
and AU submissions that account for these results, answered in the results to Question 2.  
Figure 5. Textual Similarity (coded by cluster assignment)  
 
Question 2: Topic Modeling  
 To begin to uncover the framing of the EU and AU submissions, topic modeling was 
performed on the clusters to derive the top six words for each cluster (Table 2). After evaluating the 
output, a narrative began to emerge with the vocabulary of the EU submissions emphasizing the 
individual creator. The most frequent words appearing in the EU clusters were “publisher,” 
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“authors,” and “rights.” This suggests an inward-looking response, as stakeholders considered the 
regulation through its impacts on the current ecosystem of news with particular focus on authors 
versus publishers. This is a sharp contrast to the AU clusters which much more frequently call out 
the perceived threat of platforms such as Google News. This is evidenced by the most frequent 
words appearing in the AU clusters being “platforms” and words describing news content such as 
“media,” “news,” and “information.” The results in Table 2 echo the results established in Question 
1 with hardly any of the frequently used words identified overlapping between the EU and AU 
clusters.      
Table 2. K-Means Topic Modeling  
 
 
Question 3: Manual Text Analysis  
The “creator” frame manifests itself across the EU submissions. Yet, it is important to note 
that the emphasis on the individual creator does not mean all of the submissions hold the same 
Cluster Cons.  Output 
Cluster 1 EU authors, rights, publishers, remuneration, visual, neighbouring 
Cluster 3 EU rights, publishers, neighbouring, neighbouring, new, authors  
 
Cluster 5 EU rights, publishers, journalists, authors, works, neighboring 
 
Cluster 6 EU  publishers, rights, authors, content, press, copyright 
 
Cluster 10 EU publishers, rights, new, new, copyright, content 
 




AU journalism, media, fund, news, abc, publications 
  
Cluster 4 AU platforms, digital, Australian, digital, infringements, content 
 
Cluster 8 AU privacy, data, consumers, recommend, platforms, information 
 
Cluster 9 AU platforms, digital, news, advertisers, digital, media 
 
Cluster 7 EU/AU children, media, platforms, digital, young, regulatory 
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position towards the proposed regulation. Rather, as noted in the Theoretical Approach section, a frame 
is emphasizing one aspect of an issue over another. Thus, in this case, while the EU consultation 
largely emphasizes the impact of the proposed regulation on creators such as journalists, writers, and 
authors — all the submissions do not necessarily hold the same opinion towards whether that 
impact is positive or negative.  
The EU submissions also share a tendency to barely mention digital platforms such as 
Google News and instead focuses on the power dynamics of creators versus publishers and 
questions related to the ownership of the news content itself. This tactic raises questions, specifically 
if the focus on the traditional players in the news media industry and subsequent infighting hindered 
the larger goal of regulating Google News. To better understand these dynamics, Table 3 maps the 
general positioning of each EU cluster towards the proposed regulation and evidence of how the 
“creator” frame is expressed in each cluster.  
Table 3. EU Clusters | Creator Frame  




exploitation       
84: The Authors Guild 
of the Netherlands 
 
“[publishers] would get even more... while authors get even less. The 
underlying problem is the lack of a level playing field between 
publishers and authors and fair contracts” (EU Selected Submissions, 
211).  
 
  87: Norwegian Visual 
Artists Copyright Society  
 
“It is most likely that publishers will seek ways to circumvent authors 
and visual creators in order to ensure that such remunerations are paid 






85: Vrijschrift “It would unjustly benefit the biggest publishers...as well as introduce 
unnecessary friction in the marketplace through transaction costs” 
(176).  
  95: Impresa  “A new Publisher's Right would allow the Publisher to not depend on 
any acquisition of third-party rights (e.g., Author) in order to enforce its 
rights. This would make enforcement simpler, quicker, cheaper and 







13: European Federation 
of Journalists  
 
“the neighboring right could conflict with journalists’ own 
reproduction and making available right over the content on which they 
still own the rights (if not exclusively licensed)” (EU Selected 
Submissions, 151).  
 
  54: Martin Kroll  
 
“the more rights you grant to nonoriginal stakeholders in any 
whatsoever artistic or creative field, the more it could backfire to the 





welfare        
23: The Union of 
Publishers of Bulgaria  
“The acknowledgement of publishers in all sectors as right holders 
would have a positive impact on authors, as publisher's revenues will 
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 Whether an EU stakeholder is for or against the proposed “press publisher right,” the 
consultation responses share an emphasis on how authors, journalists, and writers will be impacted. 
The “creator” frame appears in each cluster, underscoring the influence of the creator centric 
copyright orientation in the civil law legal system.  
In Cluster 1, respondents such as the Norwegian Visual Artists Copyright Society fear 
“publishers will seek ways to circumvent authors” in order to keep remunerations for themselves 
(EU Selected Submissions, 191). This fear articulated in Cluster 1 of the potential strengthening of 
press publisher power at the expense of creator rights offers an initial starting point for 
understanding how unsettled the industry perspective is towards addressing news aggregators. This 
 rise and a fair share of the increased income would certainly benefit 
authors and allow more editions to be profitable” (EU Selected 
Submissions, 123).  
 
  95: The Polish Chamber 
of Press Publishers  
 
“A publisher’s right would be without prejudice to authors’ rights and 
will have no impact on the contractual relationship between publishers 
and journalists” (EU Selected Submissions, 105).  
 
  126: The Publishers 
Association 
 
“Authors would see the technical environment around their content 
better protected and publishers’ capacity to invest in new content and 
technology strengthened” (EU Selected Submissions, 86).  
 
10 damage all 
stakeholders  
 
22: Wikimedia  “The results we can observe in the countries that attempted this are 
negative through the board. Both publishers and journalists are losing 
traffic and exposure of their content, leading to a drop in revenues” 
(EU Selected Submissions, 71). 
 
  86: Scoop Foundation 
for Public Interest 
Journalism 
“For the same reasons that it would be a disaster for online service 
providers, internet, regulators and the rule of law it would be a disaster 
for the public - it would break the internet (EU Selected Submissions, 
62) 
 
  103: Association of 
Spanish Startups  
“The idea that everything published in writing on the internet should 
get an additional, new set of copyright rules is scary. It promises a new 
wave of legal uncertainty, complexity and red-tape for all the 
businesses, large and small” (EU Selected Submissions, 46).  
 
  131: Mozilla  “The harm that would come from imposition of such an extraneous 
and unnecessary mechanism would stifle innovation and creativity and 
would lead to less interesting content available to be published - above 
and beyond the proximate and specific problems that publishers face - 
creating long-term damage to the entire ecosystem” (EU Selected 
Submissions, 21).  
 
11 neutral   50: Hachette Livre   “the impact on publishers of the creation of a new neighboring right in 
EU law needs to be further explored” (EU Selected Submissions, 6).  
 
Ors  39 
uncertainty translates to an emerging narrative that often pits creators and publishers against each 
other — something that continues throughout the rest of the EU clusters.  
Cluster 3 submissions largely focused on the economic implications of the proposed 
regulation, but still orient this economic analysis towards its impacts on creators versus publishers. 
This is exemplified in the response submitted by Impresa, a Portuguese publication, which explains 
how a press publisher right would enable it to avoid acquiring copyrights from writers. This would 
in turn make it easier for Impresa to enforce its rights when litigating copyright infringement claims 
against news aggregators (EU Selected Submissions, 162). In other words, Impresa believes the 
regulation would make “enforcement simpler, quicker, cheaper and with less parties involved” (ibid). 
There is a perceived economic efficiency associated with a press publisher right because it would 
allow for creator’s rights to be circumvented and a subsequent decrease in transaction costs — a 
belief shared across submissions belonging to Cluster 3. It is interesting that publishers view the 
creators of news content to be such an obstruction to exercising their rights over news aggregators. 
While Cluster 1 expresses a fear of creators being exploited by publishers, Cluster 3 seemingly 
admits this to be true and acknowledges it would allow publishers to increase their legal rights over 
news content written by creators such as journalists and writers.   
 Cluster 5 calls out the harm a press publisher right poses to creator welfare but does not 
focus as heavily on the publisher exploitation factor described in Cluster 1. As Cluster 5 is largely 
composed of stakeholders representing journalists and writers’ interests, it is expected that the 
“creator” frame would be present. The European Federation of Journalists expresses a concern 
voiced by multiple submissions in Cluster 5 that a press publisher right would hinder creators from 
syndicating their content across multiple publications (EU Selected Submissions, 151). In other 
words, once a piece of news content is published in one publication, a press publisher right would 
cause that publication to have proprietary access to that content, barring a creator from publishing 
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the piece elsewhere at a later date. Other concerns voiced in Cluster 5 hinge on this idea that a press 
publisher right would disrupt how creators perform their tasks such as securing interviews when 
future publication of the content produced is at the discretion of the publication, not the creator 
itself.  In the words of Martin Kroll, a journalist based in Germany, “the more rights you grant to 
nonoriginal stakeholders in any whatsoever artistic or creative field, the more it could backfire to the 
original artist” (EU Selected Submissions, 134).    
The sentiment expressed by Kroll that a press publisher right would “backfire” on creators is 
a stark contrast to Cluster 6 which claims the proposed regulation would actually enhance creator 
welfare. At the crux of these submissions is the belief that a press publisher right would lead to 
increased revenues for press publishers which would then be passed down to the creators generating 
content for these publications. For example, The Publishers Association believes a press publisher 
right would lead to “the technical environment around their content better protected and publishers’ 
capacity to invest in new content and technology strengthened” (EU Selected Submissions, 86). 
Cluster 10 not only believes remunerations will be reinvested into creators’ pockets, but also the 
current relationship between publishers and creators will remain the same following the passage of a 
press publisher right. As the Polish Chamber of Press Publishers explains, “a publisher’s right would 
be without prejudice to authors’ rights and will have no impact on the contractual relationship 
between publishers and journalists” (EU Selected Submissions, 95). This is a direct contradiction to 
submissions in Cluster 1 and Cluster 5 that believe creators will be exploited by publishers and not 
reap the benefits of remunerations.  
 Cluster 10 does not believe a press publisher right will help creators or publishers, instead 
suggesting it will harm the entire ecosystem of news. As the membership of Cluster 10 is largely 
comprised of technology interests, it makes sense that a total rejection of the press publisher right 
would occur. Google is included in Cluster 10 with a submission warning of the complexity that will 
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ensue when “the rights of authors and those of publishers are in different ownership” (EU Google 
Submission, 3). Yet, it is not just the big technology conglomerate who recognizes this possibility. 
The Association of Spanish Startups similarly fear “a new wave of legal uncertainty, complexity and 
red tape for all the businesses, large and small” if a press publisher right is passed (EU Selected 
Submissions, 46). Cluster 10 also includes a submission by the Scoop Foundation for Public Interest 
Journalism which surprisingly aligns with the technology companies by citing how it would be a 
disaster for many stakeholders and “break the internet” (EU Selected Submissions, 62). In 
comparison to the other EU clusters, Cluster 10 has the least representation of the “creator” frame 
and most similarity to the AU frames centered around content. One reason for this could be many 
organizations with a stake in protecting technology interests are headquartered in the United States, 
a country with a common law legal tradition that could inform an interpretation more similar to AU.  
 Cluster 11 is the smallest cluster and more difficult to pinpoint a shared narrative among the 
submissions, but there is a general neutrality expressed towards the press publisher right and 
hesitancy to stake any clear position towards the regulation. 
Pivoting to the AU clusters, a manual text analysis revealed an emphasis on the digital 
platforms themselves including the focus of this thesis — Google News. This translated to 
stakeholders framing their submissions via the news content and how it is distributed and accessed 
on news aggregators. Unlike the EU clusters, there is little mention of who is creating the content 
and their interaction with publishers. Table 4 reports the positioning of each cluster and offers 
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Table 4. AU Clusters | Public Interest Frame  
  










“The structure of the media market and consumer behaviour and 
expectations in that market have irrevocably changed. What has not changed 
is that for the market to thrive and deliver competition, quality, and choice 
to consumers, as well as provide a public good” (AU Selected Submissions, 
152).                                            k 
  208: Monash 
University  
“I would encourage the inquiry to think broadly about ‘news and journalistic 
content’...  to focus on these purposes or functions of journalism, rather 
than on the locations in which the journalism takes place” (AU Selected 







“Digital platforms holding significant market power should have some 
accountability for the misuse of others by their platforms (whether it be the 
sharing or locating of infringing content)” (AU Selected Submissions, 156).   
 
  240: Stan  “there should be greater onus on social and digital media platforms to police 




to information    
60: K-Monitor   “[a press publisher right] would restrict access to information and limit 
freedom of expression” (AU Selected Submissions, 113).   
 
  160: Australian 
Communications 
and Media Authority 
“There should be a diversity of major information sources and perspectives 
expressed in the public sphere to foster an informed citizenry and healthy 




misuse of privacy 
and competition 
law   
149: U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce  
“Competition law should not, as some have suggested, be used as a tool to 
address broader social policy issues... or to promote the interests of 
competitors or other third parties over consumers” (AU Selected 
Submissions, 86).  
 
  151: UNSW Sydney: 
Allens Hub  
“Concealed data practices clearly raise consumer protection concerns, but 
they also raise competition issues” (AU Selected Submissions, 78).  
 
  164: Australian 
Privacy Foundation  
 
“The effective control of large data sets exercised by platforms, such as 
Google and Facebook, supports and reinforces network effects and the 
substantial market power possessed by platforms” (AU Selected 
Submissions, 65).  
 
  173: Computer & 
Communications 
Industry Association 
“The key to gaining a competitive edge in the digital economy is not the 
accumulation of data, but rather, the capacity to analyze and monetize data” 
(AU Selected Submissions, 42).  
 
9 value of 
publisher content   
230: Queensland 
County Press Assoc.  
“No other media — certainly not Google or Facebook — produces the 
unique content our member newspapers provide” (AU Selected 
Submissions, 31). 
  
  199: International 
Center for Law and 
Economics  
“Newspapers and digital journalism have no normative claim over the online 
advertising revenue. These are markets that did not exist before they were 
established by Google” (AU Selected Submissions, 18).  
 
  180: Digital Industry 
Trade Association  
“For many journalists, these platforms form an integral part of how they 
identify emerging stories, distribute content, connect with audiences, and 
measure engagement” (AU Selected Submissions, 2). 
 
  213: News Corp 
Australia  
“Publishers of news and journalism are being increasingly corralled into 
creating content that benefits the digital platforms – rapid, undifferentiated, 
even copied, ad-funded content” (News Corp Submission, 88). 
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 Cluster 2 considers journalistic content via the public good role it serves in society. For 
example, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation notes the central role of the media market is to 
“deliver competition, quality, and choice to consumers, as well as provide a public good” (AU 
Selected Submissions, 152). This focus on the role of content is shared by other submissions in 
Cluster 2 including academics at Monash University who believe an examination on the “purposes 
or functions of journalism” should take precedent over the “locations in which the journalism takes 
place” (AU Selected Submissions, 123). This is different from the EU clusters which devote a 
significant amount of their submissions to debating whether journalism should even be allowed to 
be distributed on certain platforms and not others.  
 In combination, Cluster 4 and Cluster 8 focus their attention on the more technical 
components of the proposed regulation including the absence of a safe harbor protection and data 
privacy concerns which are outside the scope of this thesis but do reinforce a concern for the 
protecting the content itself. Cluster 4 emphasizes holding news aggregators accountable for 
infringing upon news content. This is expressed by the Australian Copyright Council whose 
submission advocates for “accountability for...sharing or locating of infringing content” (AU 
Selected Submissions, 123). Cluster 8 is concerned with the data collection tactics of news 
aggregators in relation to the type of content read by users and how they interact with the platform. 
Cluster 8 also represents a debate about the application of competition and data privacy law, all tied 
to the market power of news aggregators. Cluster 8 is arguably an outlier in relation to direct use of 
the content frame, but the undertones of the submissions still relate to how consumers are accessing 
news content on the platforms.  
Cluster 9 is perhaps the most explicit example of the content frame with submissions 
debating the value of publisher content and whether news aggregators are taking advantage of the 
content produced by newsrooms. The makeup of submissions in Cluster 9 features both journalism 
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and technology interests, demonstrating the pressure felt both stakeholders to answer whether the 
aggregation of news content by technology companies is acceptable. Explained by the Queensland 
County Press Association, “no other media — certainly not Google or Facebook — produces the 
unique content our member newspapers provide” (AU Selected Submissions, 31). This is a 
sentiment shared by press publishers across Cluster 9, including News Corp whose submission goes 
further to point out how news aggregators are reshaping the content landscape for the worse with 
the reality of “rapid, undifferentiated, even copied, ad-funded content” performing better on news 
aggregators than higher quality reporting (News Corp Submission, 88). Cluster 9 also includes the 
rebuttal of technology interests such as the Digital Industry Trade Association which attempts to 
highlight how news aggregators provide tools to journalists to help enhance their content and 
“identify emerging stories, distribute content, connect with audiences, and measure engagement” 
(AU Selected Submissions, 2). Included in these rebuttals from technology companies is the 
response of Google which defends its news aggregator product by stating how it has made “it easier 
for users to search for journalistic content and to connect with the publishers that have the news 
that most interests them” (AU Google Submission, 10). This is a contrast to how Google frames its 
response to the EU consultation in Cluster 10 with the “creator” frame.  
As noted earlier, Cluster 7 is largely comprised of AU submissions, but does include an EU 
submission by K-Monitor, a Hungarian digital rights NGO. The emphasis of Cluster 7 is on 
consumer wellbeing and mostly includes AU stakeholders representing digital rights interests. For 
example, The Australian Communications and Media Authority makes a claim that the diversity of 
information sources and perspectives found in news content play a critical role in fostering “an 
informed citizenry and healthy democracy” (AU Selected Submissions, 97). This is similar to the K-
Monitor submission which expresses reservations that “[a press publisher right] would restrict access 
to information and limit freedom of expression” (EU Selected Submissions, 113). For the purposes 
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of this analysis, Cluster 7 was recognized as an AU cluster because it only featured one EU 
submission and aligned with the content framing employed in the other clusters.  
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Discussion  
 
As predicted in the hypothesis, the combination of quantitative and manual text analysis 
discussed in the Results section reveals an alignment between EU and AU legal traditions and their 
respective consultation frames — “creator” and “content.” The “creator” frame prevails in the EU 
submissions no matter if it is Impresa discussing the economic implications of a press publisher right 
or Google warning of the threats associated with a more regulated press. Whereas the content frame 
emerges across AU submissions from the Digital Industry Trade Association defending the valuable 
tools that news aggregators provide to content generation or News Corp Australia arguing that 
content quality has decreased due to news aggregators. Yet, given the EU and AU consultations 
were completed in 2016 and 2019 respectively, the question remains if these frames continue to exist 
in related policy activity in the EU, AU, and elsewhere.  
On April 15, 2019, the “Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market” passed in the 
EU. Nearly two years later, on February 25, 2021, AU passed the “News Media and Digital 
Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code.” While both the EU and AU reforms passed, the EU. 
approach of a press publisher right faced significant implementation issues, largely driven by the 
economic reality that press publishers rely on the traffic Google News drives to their own news 
sites. The only EU member country to implement the press publisher right so far has been France 
and as expected, Google refused to engage in licensing negotiations. Instead, Google offered French 
press publications a choice to either license their content for free or remove all their content from 
Google (Keller, 2020). In response, the French government abandoned the mechanism of a press 
publisher right altogether and began to explore alternatives to securing remunerations for press 
publishers. In April 2020, the French Competition Authority (FCA) became involved and accused 
Google’s “unilateral withdraw of snippets to be unfair and damaging to the press sector, and likely 
to constitute an abuse of a dominant market position” (Lomas, 2021). After Google lost its’ appeal 
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with the FCA, L’Alliance de la Presse d’Information Générale (APIG) which represents over 300 
press publications, entered into negotiations with Google to reach an agreement on remunerations. 
On January 21, 2021 a framework was announced for French press publications to enter 
independent licensing agreements with Google (ibid). This sequence of events in France proves 
once again that the press publisher right passed in the EU has yet to succeed, with many academics 
questioning if it can ever be the vehicle for press publishers to achieve remunerations. As described 
by Dusollier (2020), “the compromises and bad choices made by the Directive lead to intricate 
provisions whose success might be illusory. This is clear for the press publications right, the utility 
and strength of which are disputable.” This is in contrast to AU where despite the regulation only 
passing a few weeks ago, has already proven to be more successful at bringing Google to the 
negotiating table. On February 4, 2021, before the AU regulation even officially passed, Google 
preemptively introduced the Google News Showcase in AU, a program for streamlining the 
negotiation of licensing deals with individual press publications. To date, Google has entered 
licensing deals with over 70 AU press publications to avoid the forced arbitration stipulated in the 
regulation (Beddoe, 2021).  
The early success of the AU regulation has been paired with AU regulators continuing to 
embrace the “content” frame. Josh Frydenberg, the federal treasurer, celebrated the passage of the 
regulation by stating, “the Code will ensure that news media businesses are fairly remunerated for 
the content they generate, helping to sustain public interest journalism in Australia” (Lomas, 2021). 
Conversely, in the EU there has been an abandonment of the “creator” frame in favor of the 
“content” frame which has proved to be more successful in AU. This has been accompanied by calls 
from some members of the EU Parliament to amend current regulatory proposals related to the 
DSM to include measures similar to the AU regulation. For example, Andrus Ansip, Member of 
European Parliament representing Estonia noted, “we will never accept this situation when 
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somebody is using content ... and authors are not remunerated at all” (Espinoza and Barker, 2021). 
Similarly, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Member of European Parliament representing France stated, “it’s 
time to oblige online platforms to engage in fair negotiations to remunerate the news content they 
obtain from press publishers” (Espinoza and Barker, 2021). The emergence of EU politicians 
stepping away from the creator centric approach that guided previous news aggregator regulatory 
efforts reinforces the belief that a “content” frame is more successful in policy debates aiming to 
bring Google to the negotiating table.  
It is not just the EU embracing the “content” frame. A review of other countries considering 
news aggregator regulation revealed an emphasis of content over the creator as well. For example, 
the “Journalism Competition and Preservation Act” reintroduced in the United States Congress on 
March 10, 2021 has been paired with a “content” frame. Statements by bill co-sponsor Senator Amy 
Klobuchar reference how the legislation “will improve the quality of reporting” (Klobuchar, 2021). 
In the United Kingdom, similar steps have been taken with the Digital Markets Taskforce 
announcing its intention to force Google and Facebook to pay news outlets for content. 
Additionally, the House of Lords is currently revising the “Online Harms Bills” to include news 
aggregator regulation policies inspired by the AU. Dr. Andrea Coscelli, CEO of the Competition 
and Markets Authority, who is responsible for leading these efforts in the UK has employed a 
content frame noting, “competitors should face a level playing field — enabling them to deliver 
more of the innovative products and services we value so highly” (Coulter, 2021). Lastly, in Canada 
there has mounting pressure from press publishers for the government to regulate news aggregators. 
On February 4, 2021 Canadian newspapers published a blank front page to protest news aggregators 
and convey how critical role their role is in news content generation (Gilmore, 2021). Simply put, the 
campaign communicated that the content available on Google News would not exist without their 
newsrooms. Heritage Minister, Steven Guilbeault has also employed a “content” frame by 
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emphasizing the value of news content when he stated, “news is not free and never has been” 
(Coulter, 2021). All of these regulatory efforts suggest the “content” frame has prevailed, raising the 
question why this is the case.  
The reason for the success of the “content” frame can be attributed to the fact that Google 
does not create content itself. Unlike the “creator” frame which is rather inward looking and does 
not easily lend itself to arguments defending the public interest, the “content” frame has proven to 
be a powerful tool to reinforce how a healthy press publishing sector is necessary for creating the 
news content that informs the population. While it is certainly debatable if the application of 
competition law is appropriate and if a true market power imbalance exists between press publishers 
and news aggregators, what is not debatable is that the newsrooms create content and Google does 
not. This fact has carried stakeholders in AU and France much further than prior attempts to prove 
copyright infringement or defend the ownership of a particular written work, motivating the 
adoption of the “content” frame.  
 However, the implications associated with the abandonment of the “creator” frame must 
also be considered. While the twenty-first century has been termed the “content revolution,” there is 
an emerging next wave of self-published journalism focused on the creator. Led by new journalism 
enterprise models, journalists are leaving the mastheads of traditional press publications to reach 
their audiences directly. For example, Substack is a service that enables writers to draft, edit, and 
send email newsletters to free or paid subscribers on their own. Its’ value proposition is not 
grounded in content, but rather the creator itself. This intention is confirmed by Substack CEO, 
Chris Best, who aims “to allow writers and creators to run their own personal media empire” 
(Fatemi, 2021). The service currently has more than 250,000 paying subscribers with the top ten 
newsletters collectively generating over $7 million in annualized revenue (ibid). The business model 
of Substack has proven to be quite enticing to creators as explained by Substack author, Judd 
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Legum, “it’s not about gaming the Google algorithm or the Facebook algorithm. Instead, it’s about 
writing compelling content that wins hearts and minds” (ibid). Moreover, many career journalists 
who have migrated to Substack have said to have earned more recognition and money than their 
previous reporting jobs (ibid). Many of the most popular newsletters on Substack share an attribute 
of newsworthiness including “Letters from an American” by Heather Cox Richardson who 
contextualizes the current political landscape in history, “The Bitcoin Forecast” by Willy Woo which 
offers Bitcoin pricing projections, and “Platformer” by Casey Newton which reports on social 
networks and democracy.  
If the “creator” frame is abandoned to accommodate the “content” frame, then regulators 
may risk harming tomorrow’s wave of self-published journalistic endeavors. Arguably it is the niche, 
self-published creators and emerging journalism enterprises like Substack that are addressing the 
threats posed by Google News in a more crafty and inventive way than traditional press publishers 
relying on a paycheck from Google. So, while the “content” frame may be a mightier weapon 
against Google News today, this does not mean it won’t harm innovative efforts that rely on the 
freedom of the internet to distribute original reporting by creators. If there is anything that the 
history of copyright and the press has demonstrated, it is that protecting written works is a never-
ending battle that requires a dynamic tactical approach. From the “Copyright Act of Queen Anne” 
to Murdoch’s accusations of theft against Google News, to the emergence of competition law 
regulation in AU, all of these developments reinforce the notion that how copyright is framed today 
may change tomorrow.   
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Appendix 2. Cluster Membership 
 
# ID Organization Name  Stakeholder Type  Gov  
 15 European Visual Artists Collective Management Organization EU  
 87 Norwegian Visual Artists Copyright Society Collective Management Organization EU  
 109 Visual Copyright Society in Sweden Collective Management Organization EU  
1 76 Association of Dutch Designers Trade Association (Other) EU   
81 Platform Makers Writer EU   
84 The Authors Guild of the Netherlands Writer EU  
  114 Creators' Rights Alliance Writer EU  
 208 Monash University: Margaret Simons Education or Research Institution AU  
 133 ABC Broadcaster AU  
 153 Walkley Foundation Journalist AU  
2 178 Croakey Health Media Scientific Publisher AU   
137 Andrew Jaspan Journalist AU   
144 The Judith Neilson Institute for Journalism and Ideas Education or Research Institution AU 
 
  229 Public Interest Journalism Initiative Press Publisher AU  
 110 European Broadcasting Union Broadcaster EU  
 33 Finnish Authors' Copyright Society Collective Management Organization EU  
 85 Vrijschrift Consumer EU  
 29 Denmarks Electronic Research Library Education or Research Institution EU  
 34 Finnish IT Center for Science Education or Research Institution EU  
 67 University of Dublin: Trinity College Library Education or Research Institution EU  
 118 Joint Information Systems Committee  Education or Research Institution EU  
 40 Oulu University Library Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
 61 National Széchényi Library of Hungary Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
 63 Consortium of National & University Libraries Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
 44 Union of Finnish Writers Writer EU  
 65 Local Ireland Press Publisher EU  
3 95 Impresa Press Publisher EU   
111 Association of Photographers Professional Photographer EU    
116 Getty Images Professional Photography EU   
125 The British Photographic Council Professional Photographer EU   
106 Spanish Copyright Office  Public Authority EU   
47 Explore Media Startup EU   
2 AMEC / FIBEP Trade Association (Media) EU   
48 Federation of Media Watch Companies Trade Association (Media) EU   
52 German Association for Law and Informatics Trade Association (Technology) EU   
16 European Writers' Council Writer EU  
  44 Union of Finnish Writers Writer EU  
4 158 Australian Copyright Council NGO (Copyright) AU  
 161 Australian Film & TV Bodies Broadcaster AU  
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 190 Gladwin Legal Legal Institutions AU  
 240 Stan Technology Company AU  
4 233 QUT School of Law: Nicolas Suzor Education or Research Institution AU  
 235 Redbubble Technology Company AU  
 242 StartupAUS Startup AU   
160 Australian Digital Alliance NGO (Copyright) AU  
  185 Foxtel Broadcaster AU  
 21 The European Grouping of Societies of Authors and Composers Collective Management Organization EU 
 
 97 Portuguese Society of Authors Collective Management Organization EU  
 123 Publishers Licensing Society Limited Collective Management Organization EU  
 13 European Federation of Journalists Journalist EU  
5 45 Union of Journalists in Finland Journalist EU  
 77 Dutch Journalist Association Journalist EU  
 62 ProArt Hungarian Copyright Alliance NGO (Copyright) EU   
113 British Association of Picture Libraries and Agencies 




59 Association of Private Law Lecturers Trade Association (Other) EU   
54 Martin Kroll Writer EU  
  92 Polish Society of Authors and Composers  Writer EU  
 126 The Publishers Association Book Publisher EU  
 19 International Federation of Reproduction Rights Organizations Collective Management Organization EU 
 
 98 Visapress Collective Management Organization EU  
 112 Authors Licensing and Collecting Society  Collective Management Organization EU   
 28 Charles University: Institute of Formal and Applied Linguistics Education or Research Institution EU 
 
 11 European Copyright Society NGO (Copyright) EU  
 23 Union of Publishers of Bulgaria Press Publisher EU  
 25 Europapress Holding Press Publisher EU  
 26 Stryria Media Group Press Publisher EU  
6 36 Finnish Newspapers Association Press Publisher EU  
 39 Medialitto Press Publisher EU  
 93 The Polish Chamber of Press Publishers Press Publisher EU  
 96 Portuguese Press Association Press Publisher EU  
 101 Ringier Romania Press Publisher EU  
 102 Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia Press Publisher EU  
 115 European Publishers Council Press Publisher EU  
 120 News Media Association Press Publisher EU  
 122 Professional Publishers Association Press Publisher EU  
 104 Podemos Public Authority EU  
 55 Springer Nature Scientific Publisher EU  
 117 International Association of Scientific, Technical and Medical Publishers Scientific Publisher EU 
 
 9 EURIMAG Trade Association (Other) EU  
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 90 Creative Poland Association Trade Association (Other) EU  
 7 DigitalEurope Trade Association (Technology) EU  
 69 Anitec Trade Association (Telecommunications) EU 
 
 42 The Finnish Association of Non-Fiction Writers Writer EU  
 124 Society of Authors Writer EU  
 157 Australian Communications and Media Authority Public Authority AU  
 219 Office of the eSafety Commissioner Public Authority AU  
 232 Queensland University and University of Sydney (Terry Flew and Tim Dwyer) Education or Research Institution AU 
 
7 60 K-Monitor NGO (Digital Rights) EU  
 132 5Rights Foundation NGO (Digital Rights) AU  
 170 Centre for Media Transition Education or Research Institution AU   
228 Public Health Association of Australia Consumer AU  
  227 Public Health Advocacy Institute of WA Consumer AU  
 139 Association for Data-driven Marketing & Advertising Advertising and Public Relations AU 
 
 231 Queensland Law Society Legal Institutions AU  
 172 Communications Alliance Trade Association (Media) AU  
 156 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Public Authority AU  
 175 Consumer Policy Research Centre Consumer AU  
 220 Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner Public Authority AU  
 136 American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Legal Institutions AU  
 218 Office of the Australian information Commissioner Public Authority AU  
 147 TotallyAwesome Startup AU  
8 151 UNSW Sydney: Allens Hub for Technology, Law, and Innovation (Katharine Kemp & Rob Nicholls) Education or Research Institution AU 
 
 149 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Public Authority AU  
 150 UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy Public Authority AU  
 152 UNSW Sydney: Kayleen Manwaring Education or Research Institution AU  
 164 Australian Privacy Foundation NGO (Digital Rights) AU   
174 Consumer Action Law Centre Consumer AU   
201 Internet of Things Alliance Australia Trade Association (Telecommunications) AU 
 
 
206 Melbourne Law School: Jeannie Marie Paterson Education or Research Institution AU   
168 BSA The Software Alliance Trade Association (Technology) AU   
197 Iconoclast Tech Education or Research Institution AU   
222 Oracle Technology Company AU   
159 Australian Data Privacy Certification Register NGO (Digital Rights) AU  
  173 Computer & Communications Industry Association Trade Association (Technology) AU  
 142 Tania Katsanis Startup AU  
 221 oOh!media Advertising and Public Relations AU  
9 148 Twitter Technology Company AU  
 198 Innovation Defense Foundation Trade Association (Technology) AU  
 202 Intran Australia NGO (Digital Rights) AU  
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 226 Provincial Press Group Press Publisher AU  
 163 Australian Press Council Press Publisher AU  
 162 Australian Lottery and Newsagents' Association Press Publisher AU  
 214 NewsMediaWorks Press Publisher AU  
 215 Nine Broadcaster AU  
 181 DuckDuckGo Technology Company AU  
 183 Fairfax Media Press Publisher AU  
 184 Food4U Startup AU  
 186 Free TV Trade Association (Media) AU  
 193 Guardian Australia Press Publisher AU  
 195 Harley Comrie Journalist AU  
 199 International Center for Law and Economics Education or Research Institution AU  
 212 News & Media Research Centre Education or Research Institution AU  
 239 Special Broadcasting Service Broadcaster AU  
 166 Australian Radio Network Broadcaster AU  
 182 Facebook Technology Company AU  
 241 Star News Group Press Publisher AU  
 138 Arnold Bloch Leibler Legal Institutions AU  
9 177 Country Press Australia Press Publisher AU  
 204 McPherson Media Group Press Publisher AU  
 224 Post Newspapers Press Publisher AU  
 145 The North Western Courier Press Publisher AU  
 134 Access Now NGO (Digital Rights) AU  
 146 Tony Healy Technology Company AU  
 189 Getty Images Professional Photography AU  
 141 Australian Associated Press Press Publisher AU  
 180 Digital Industry Group Incorporated Trade Association (Technology) AU  
 191 Global Antitrust Institute Education or Research Institution AU  
 200 Internet Australia Trade Association (Telecommunications) AU 
 
 210 Netflix Technology Company AU  
 211 Network Ten Broadcaster AU   
213 News Corp Australia Press Publisher AU   
216 NSW Business Chamber Public Authority AU   
217 NSW Young Lawyers Legal Institutions AU   
223 Outdoor Media Association Press Publisher AU   
225 Progressive Policy Institute Education or Research Institution AU   
116 Getty Images Professional Photography AU   
135 Ad Standards Public Authority AU   
143 The Communications Council Advertising and Public Relations AU   
203 James Meese Education or Research Institution AU   
205 Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance Trade Association (Media) AU   
207 Microsoft Technology Company AU  
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237 Simon Thompson Legal Institutions AU   
238 Southern Cross Austereo Press Publisher AU   
165 Australian Publishers Association Press Publisher AU   
171 Commercial Radio Australia Broadcaster AU   
230 Queensland Country Press Association Press Publisher AU   
169 Carol O'Donnell Education or Research Institution AU   
179 David Fagan Journalist AU   
194 Guillaume Roger Education or Research Institution AU   
209 National Association for the Visual Arts Trade Association (Other) AU   
234 REA Group Advertising and Public Relations AU   
236 Seven West Media Press Publisher AU   
140 Audited Media Association of Australia Trade Association (Media) AU   
192 Google Technology Company AU   
196 Harvard Kennedy School: Mitchell Watt & Hubert Wu Education or Research Institution AU 
 
 
155 Australian Associated Press Press Publisher AU   
167 Australian Society of Authors Writer AU   
187 Freedom Publishers Union Press Publisher AU   
188 George Mason University: Mercatus Center (Christine McDaniel & Danielle Parks) Education or Research Institution AU 
 
  154 Worldview Exchange Technology Company AU  
 66 Public Relations Institute of Ireland Advertising and Public Relations EU  
 130 Microsoft Press Book Publisher EU  
 56 VG Media Collective Management Organization EU  
 82 SURFmarket Collective Management Organization EU  
 4 COMMUNIA International Association on the Public Domain Consumer EU 
 
 10 European Consumer Organization Consumer EU  
 12 European Digital Rights Consumer EU  
 68 Altroconsumo Consumer EU  
 99 Association for Technology and Internet Consumer EU  
 128 Center for Democracy & Technology  Consumer EU  
10 0 University of Vienna: Media Governance and Industries Research Lab Education or Research Institution EU 
 
 53 Helmholtz Open Science Coordination Office Education or Research Institution EU  
 73 Nexa Center for Internet & Society Education or Research Institution EU  
 94 Wroclaw University of Technology Education or Research Institution EU  
 127 University of Strathclyde Education or Research Institution EU  
 27 Association of Library and Information Professionals of the Czech Republic Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU 
 
 31 The Danish Library Association Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
 32 Council for Finnish University Libraries Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
 35 Finnish Library Association Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
 38 Helsinki University Library Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
 43 The National Library of Finland Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
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 78 European Bureau of Library, Information and Documentation Associations Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU 
 
 79 FOBID Netherlands Library Forum Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
 83 The Association of European Research Libraries Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
 89 Cracow University of Technology Library  Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU  
 108 The International Association of Music Libraries, Archives and Documentation Centres Library/Cultural Heritage Institution EU 
 
 20 Partnership for Copyright & Society (SA&S) NGO (Copyright) EU  
 80 Kennisland NGO (Copyright) EU  
 119 Libraries and Archives Copyright Alliance NGO (Copyright) EU  
 22 Wikimedia NGO (Digital Rights) EU  
 24 OpenMedia NGO (Digital Rights) EU  
 91 Modern Poland Foundation NGO (Digital Rights) EU  
 107 Spanish Digital Economy Association NGO (Digital Rights) EU  
 121 OpenForum Europe NGO (Digital Rights) EU  
 57 yeebase media GmbH Press Publisher EU  
 86 Scoop Foundation for Public Interest Journalism Press Publisher EU  
 88 300Polityka Press Publisher EU  
10 105 Spanish Association of Periodical Publishers Press Publisher EU  
 1 Allied for Startups Startup EU  
 30 Doable Startup EU  
 103 Association of Spanish Startups Startup EU  
 179 David Fagan Journalist EU  
 129 Google Technology Company EU  
 131 Mozilla Technology Company EU  
 6 Copyright for Creativity Trade Association (Information Science) EU 
 
 100 Kosson Trade Association (Information Science) EU 
 
 5 Computer and Communications Industry Association Trade Association (Technology) EU 
 
 8 EDiMA Trade Association (Technology) EU  
 41 The Federation of Finnish Technology Industries Trade Association (Technology) EU  
 64 ICT Ireland Trade Association (Technology) EU   
14 European Internet Services Providers Association Trade Association (Telecommunications) EU 
 
 
70 Assinform Trade Association (Telecommunications) EU 
 
 
71 Confindustria Digitale Trade Association (Telecommunications) EU 
 




 3 Association of Belgian Publishers Book Publisher EU  
 17 Federation of European Publishers Book Publisher EU  
 18 Flemish Book Publishers Association  Book Publisher EU   
11 46 Actes Sud Book Publisher EU  
 49 French Publishers Association Book Publisher EU  
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 50 Hachette Livre Book Publisher EU   
51 Les Editions du Rouergue Book Publisher EU  
11 58 Association of Greek Publishers and Booksellers Book Publisher EU   
74 The Italian Publishers Association Book Publisher EU  
  75 Copyright and Communication Consulting Agency / Latvian Authors Association Collective Management Organization EU 
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